

What Is Rhetoric?



I specify now that rhetoric is the functional organization of discourse, within its social and cultural context, in all its aspects, exception made for its realization as a strictly formal metalanguage—in formal logic, mathematics, and in the sciences whose metalanguages share the same features. In other words: rhetoric is all of language, in its realization as discourse.

—PAOLO VALESIO
Novantiqua (1980)

[The function of rhetoric] is not to persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case.

—ARISTOTLE
Rhetoric (c. 350 BCE)

Here then we have in popular use two separate ideas of Rhetoric: one of which is occupied with the general end of the fine arts—that is to say, intellectual pleasure; the other applies itself more specifically to a definite purpose of utility, viz. fraud.

—THOMAS DE QUINCEY
"Rhetoric" (1828)

A rhetorician, I take it, is like one voice in a dialogue. Put several such voices together, with each voicing its own special assertion, let them act upon one another in cooperative competition, and you get a dialectic that, properly developed, can lead to the views transcending the limitations of each.

—KENNETH BURKE
"Rhetoric—Old and New" (1950)

Rhetoric in the most general sense may perhaps be identified with the energy inherent in communication: the emotional energy that impels the speaker to speak, the physical energy expended in the utterance, the energy level coded in the message, and the energy experienced by the recipient in decoding the message.

—GEORGE KENNEDY
"A Hoot in the Dark" (1992)

Nearly the entire history of writing is confounded with the history of reason, of which it is at once the effect, the support, and one of the privileged alibis. It has been one with the phallogocentric tradition. It is indeed that same self-admiring, self-stimulating, self-congratulatory phallogocentrism.

—HELENE CIXOUS

"The Laugh of the Medusa"
(1975)

"What is Rhetoric?" This a difficult question for which there is no short answer. The difficulty begins with the fact that rhetoric is not a *content* area that contains a definite body of knowledge, like physics; instead, rhetoric might be understood as the study and practice of shaping content. This is a common definition that has informed the vilification of rhetoric since antiquity. When rhetoric is regarded as the manipulation of the linguistic features of a text, it becomes associated by some with fraud, by others with the maintenance of institutional hierarchies. In this connection, studying rhetoric means studying how people get fooled, and rhetoric is understood as the opposite of truth. The rhetoric of a text is seen as its use of ornamental, pretentious, carefully calculated, sometimes bombastic language, through which the writer or speaker seeks power over listeners or readers.

If we consider rhetoric as the study and practice of featuring rather than shaping content, we foreground its function as a tool for "special-interest groups." The special-interest-group rhetor selects and configures language so that certain terms are privileged and endorsed, and others are ignored. In literary studies, for example, the rhetoric of the New Criticism appreciates unity, continuity, and coherence in literary works, and directs our attention to these elements; by contrast, the rhetoric of deconstruction finds literary value in the *breakdown* of these same elements. These two groups adopt different critical lexicons that strike us as mutually exclusive:

It will be sufficient if [the reader] will understand the unit meanings with which the poet begins—that is, that he understands the meanings of the words which the poet uses—and if he will so far suppress his convictions or prejudices as to see how the unit meanings or partial meanings are built into a total context. (Cleanth Brooks, *The Well Wrought Urn*, 252)

In this ideal text, the networks are many and interact, without any one of them being able to surpass the rest; this text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; it has no beginning; it is reversible; we gain access to it by several entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one; the codes it mobilizes extend *as far as the eye can reach* . . . based as it is on the infinity of language. (Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, 5–6)

Brooks employs the lexicon of unity and multiplicity and infinity. Analyzing the connection of lexical and syntactic choices to the special-interest group that an author represents has become a common academic and journalistic enterprise, so that there are numerous studies of, for instance, the rhetoric of advertising and marketing, the rhetoric of political movements, and the rhetoric of religious institutions, as well as the rhetoric of academic language itself, such as literary criticism and philosophy. However, to the extent that the meaning of rhetoric is restricted in such studies to the linguistic features of the text, they evade a fuller—and, in fact, classical—portrayal of rhetoric.

The power of eloquence, as defined in 55 CE by the Roman orator Marcus Tullius Cicero, indicates the scope of rhetoric: "The real power of eloquence is such that it embraces the origin, the influence, the changes of all things in the world, all virtues, duties, and all nature, so far as it affects the manners, minds, and lives of mankind" (*De Oratore* 3.20). Eloquence, which is for Cicero another word for rhetoric, is activated by and affects changing manners, minds, and lives as it constructs our knowledge of the world. Taking as our cue this representative classical view, we would like to present the practice of rhetoric here as much more than verbal ornamentation, and the study of rhetoric as much more than a catalog of ideological buzz words.

Rhetoric is a primarily verbal, situationally contingent, epistemic art that is both philosophical and practical and gives rise to potentially active texts. As we explicate this definition, we will attempt to interrogate it as well, recognizing that any conception of rhetoric—no matter how broad—entails ambiguities and limitations. As twentieth-century rhetorician and philosopher Kenneth Burke said, "A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing" (*Permanence and Change*, 49).

The word *text* in our definition of rhetoric can be understood in both its conventional, quite limited sense, and its ambiguous, more rhetorical sense. In the former sense, we mean by *text* any instance of spoken or written language that could be considered in isolation as a self-sufficient entity. Thus, a book, an essay, an editorial, a song's lyrics, a joke, and a speech are texts, but so are a chapter, a section of an article, a refrain in a song or poem, and a contribution to a conversation. This definition of *text* may remind you of the definition of *sentence* that you learned in elementary school: "a statement that can stand alone." You probably realize now that this is an inadequate definition of a sentence, because no statement can "stand alone"; every utterance depends for its meaning on extrinsic factors. This fact is epitomized by a famous passage from Kenneth Burke's *Philosophy of Literary Form*:

Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the discussion had already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another

comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your opponent, depending upon the quality of your ally's assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress. (110–111)

If we imagine a text as the momentary entry into an unending conversation connected to what Burke calls (after anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski) shifting “contexts of situation,” we see that defining it as an independent and self-contained entity is something of a convenience.

We will use the term *rhetor* here to indicate an individual involved in the production of a text, usually a speaker or writer; we will call readers and listeners who attend to and interpret a text *auditors*, or, as a group, the *audience*. A text is *potentially active* when the rhetor intends it to *do* something, to affect or change the auditors' minds or actions or environments. *Rhetorical analysis* is the study of whether and how texts actually do affect, influence, or change auditors. The term *potentially active* bears some scrutiny here, as one of our students, Ulrike Jaeckel, indicated in her review of this Introduction:

Does a rhetor ever NOT intend a text to do something? Since you include “a contribution to conversation” under “texts,” pretty much any utterance can become a text, . . . even (specific instances of) “hello” or “thank you.” Aren't these “potentially active”—capable of producing an effect on a hearer—just by being uttered?

We agree that all utterances are texts, and all texts have the potential to change auditors. As Ulrike Jaeckel's response indicates, our term *potentially active* had effects that we did not anticipate; that is, we did not assess its potential fully enough to predict that it might activate her questions. With this admission, we might draw a distinction between the *intended* potential activity of a text and its *unintended* potential activity. Rhetorical analysis is interested in both kinds of potential.

As a primarily verbal art, rhetoric has as its medium the written and spoken word, although many scholars study how visual images and nonverbal sounds can complement the effect of a text's words. Some use the term *rhetoric* metaphorically and speak of the rhetoric of, for instance, gestures, paintings, or films. The elocutionary movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries attempted an exhaustive analysis of the communicative effects of bodily movements in order to advise orators about what kinds of body language suited what kinds of speeches. But the elocutionists made clear that gestures do not themselves constitute rhetoric; rather, the visual image of the rhetor produced linguistic understanding in the auditors. For instance, a certain contortion of the facial features would have them think and feel “pity.” Following this understanding, we may say that rhetoric *inheres* in the words that a visual image *activates*, so that the rhetoric of a painting, for instance, may be understood as the verbal understanding that accompanies its viewing.

As a situationally contingent art, rhetoric guides prospective writers and speakers to consider the timeliness and suitability for the particular situation of any text they might produce. Ancient Greek philosophers and rhetoricians had a useful term for this abstract concept: *kairos*. Inherent in *kairos* is a sensitivity to the belief that in any situation where the potential for active communication exists, rhetors must consider whether, from the point of view of potential auditors, the time, the circumstances, and the intellectual and ideological climate are right. These are factors that are very difficult to control, let alone predict. In recent years, scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences has begun to recognize the difficulty of maintaining “stable” texts with determinate meaning; this recognition accounts for the difference in the statements by Brooks and Barthes above, written in 1947 and 1970, respectively. Barthes's statement suggests that—given infinite possibilities for meaning—*kairos* is an unachievable ideal. Adding to this view our recognition that the public realm any text enters is today more politically, ethnically, and intellectually diversified than ever, the contingent nature of rhetoric becomes a very prominent and formidable consideration.

As an epistemic art, rhetoric leads prospective auditors to see “truth” neither as something that exists in their own minds before communication nor as something that exists in the world of empirical observation that they must simply report “objectively.” Instead, rhetorical truth is something achieved *transactionally* among the rhetor and the auditors whenever they come to some shared understanding, knowledge, or belief. As coparticipants in a verbal exchange, all the parties involved are knowledge-makers.

Philosophical rhetoric is primarily concerned with the exploratory construction of knowledge. The philosophical rhetor is less concerned with the composition of a particular text than with exploring ways of knowing and defining a subject. Plato attempts to illustrate philosophical rhetoric in *Phaedrus*, in which Socrates engages in a question-and-answer exchange with Phaedrus about the nature of love, of rhetoric, and of writing, working through different possible meanings of each term. Ann E. Berthoff has recently tried to engage writing students in a kind of philosophical rhetoric through the use of a “double-entry notebook,” in which they write about a subject in one column and then return to that writing at a later date, reconsider it, and write a critique of their prior thinking/writing in a facing column. In this way, writers engage in a dialectical exchange with themselves as they try to “think, and think again,” as Berthoff puts it. Another form of philosophical rhetoric might be called *topical* rather than dialectical, originating in Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as “seeing the available means of persuasion” (*Rhetoric* 1355b) through the subjection of an issue to *topoi* or “topics,” which are strategies (such as comparison or analogy) that contribute to full investigation. As a philosophical art, rhetoric guides rhetors to think and observe deeply—intuitively, systematically, and empirically. Philosophic or exploratory rhetoric can also be seen as the foundation for practical rhetoric. That is, systematic exploration leads prospective rhetors to find what they *could* say or write in specific situations when they plan a potentially active text, even if they do not actually produce it.

Rhetoric is not logic, but they are related fields of inquiry. Logic studies the way a chain of reasoning leads from premises to incontrovertible conclusions. Rhetoric also studies how rhetors and auditors reason from premises to conclusions, but it is located in the realm of uncertainty and *probable* truth, in which conclusions are arguable rather than incontrovertible.

Rhetoric is not dialectic, although Aristotle calls rhetoric the *antistrophos* (counterpart) to dialectic, and the examples from Plato and Berthoff above suggest that rhetorical exploration can take on a dialectical—question—answer or comment—response—form. In its classical sense, dialectic is a system of reasoning about subjects for which there are few or no “hard,” scientific data or proven premises. Rhetoric also addresses such subjects, but because the practice and study of rhetoric take into account how rhetors actually shape their reasoning processes into texts that appeal to a potential auditor’s understanding and emotions, it is a more expansive, inclusive, and socioculturally alert art than dialectic.

Rhetoric is not poetics, but they are related fields as well. Poetics studies literary texts—poetry, fiction, drama, and so forth—as linguistic artifacts, examining such features as imagery, diction, textual organization, and rhythm. In his *Poetics*, Aristotle discusses the ways in which tragic drama affects its audience, and this perspective suggests that both rhetoric and poetics are audience-oriented. The decisive distinction between rhetoric and poetics rests on rhetoric’s concern with the invention of an effective text: whereas poetics regards the elements of an effective composition, rhetoric is additionally a body of resources for composing.

To anyone who would hold that rhetoric is merely an empty display of verbal ornamentation or a facile use of one-sided terms and concepts, we would offer a broader view of rhetoric’s scope: Certainly, the rhetoric of a text is the selection and organization of language it uses to move potential readers and listeners to consider its ideas and conclusions. But the rhetoric of a text is also the intellectual, cognitive, affective, and social considerations that guide the writer or speaker to use the language as he or she does, and the rhetoric of a text is the effect it actually has on people who listen to it or read it.

THE FIELD(S) OF RHETORIC

When we speak about the art of rhetoric, then, we mean the faculty that humans have—a teachable, improvable faculty—for inventing constructions of “reality” that others may regard as such. In short, rhetoric is the art of knowledge-making. Some scholars have devoted themselves to learning how this art was conceived and taught in periods since antiquity; they specialize in the history of rhetoric and have produced an impressive array of studies that indicate the ways in which the definition and purposes of rhetoric have changed through the ages, and have tied these changes to epistemological and political shifts. Other scholars study the effectiveness of actual texts, past and present, thus specializing in rhetorical criti-

cism. Perhaps one of the most famous pieces of rhetorical criticism in this century is Kenneth Burke’s essay, “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle,’ ” in *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, in which Burke tries to account for the social, political, and psychological conditions that made Hitler’s discourse persuasive.

The teaching of written and oral communication has also recently become a scholarly specialty, with the history and theory of rhetoric as its antecedent. Communication pedagogy that is grounded in a full definition of rhetoric offers students a broad view of the functions a text can perform. The rhetorical theorist-as-teacher would tend to give the following sort of characterization of rhetoric to these students:

To engage in the art of rhetoric does not solely mean producing texts that aim to persuade people to take a specific action—vote for Candidate X, invest your money in Bank Y, march in protest against Policy Z. The range of rhetoric is wide: You can create a text that will lead your auditors to wonder about a subject, to ruminate, to think in ways they have never thought before. You can create a text that clarifies a complex subject they have previously found baffling. You can inform your auditors about facts, data, and information of which they were previously unaware. You can lead your auditors to accept an idea, a proposition, a thesis. And, of course, you can move your auditors to take a specific action: vote for Candidate X, invest their money in Bank Y, march in protest against Policy Z. Teachers in antiquity proposed that the art of rhetoric appeals to an auditor’s beliefs and opinions, emotions, and aesthetic sensibilities. They named the purposes of rhetorical communication as 1) to teach, 2) to please, and 3) to move. Through the elaboration and practice of the appeals and purposes of rhetoric, you can develop a broad repertory of communication skills and strategies.

Think of the complexity of the art of rhetoric. To succeed at it calls for a thoroughly inquisitive, logical, flexible and philosophical frame of mind; an almost anthropological view of the situation in which you will be communicating, in order to assess how issues of time and place and the predispositions of potential auditors might affect your text; a knowledge of the structure, limits, and nuances of language; and a psychological ability to assay your auditors and know how to move them from believing only in their own ideas and feelings to considering and accepting yours.

Although a number of scholars and teachers specialize in the history, theory, and teaching of rhetoric *per se*, we can locate an implicit theory of rhetoric in any discussion that addresses the elements of verbal knowledge-making. The philosopher discussing the ethical limits of the human imagination, the ethnographer surveying the types of discourse in action in a village, the teacher typing up the requirements for her students’ term paper, the political scientist offering reasons for an election victory, the feminist illustrating the kinds of writing that correspond with women’s ways of knowing, the computer programmer creating

word-processing software, the cultural historian studying the different ways in which literacy has been defined through the centuries, the psychologist presenting the cognitive effects of television advertising, and the newspaper subscriber writing a letter to the editor complaining about an inaccurate article, are all both rhetors and theorists of rhetoric. They are rhetors in that they are making verbal knowledge, with the hope that others will accept it as valid; they are theorists of rhetoric in that they are explicating and criticizing particular instances of verbal knowledge-making. We offer this indication of the diverse activities that might constitute both the theory and practice of rhetoric in order to further our point that rhetoric concerns nothing less than what Terry Eagleton has called "the field of discursive practices in society as a whole" (*Literary Theory* 205).

We survey the breadth of this field more fully in Part IV of this book, which focuses on the relationships between rhetoric and cultural studies, non-Western culture, feminism, gender studies, philosophy, the arts, literary criticism, science, education, literacy, composition, technology, and oratory.

Our primary concern in this book is the development and diversification of theories of rhetoric. For the balance of this Introduction, we will essay this concern in a general fashion, with the promise that the terms and concepts we deal with here will show up again in subsequent sections, in discussions that we hope will both further explicate and complicate the nature of rhetorical theory.

THE ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC

Over the centuries, scholars have produced works that explain principles, techniques, and guidelines for practicing the art of rhetoric. Because they have generally been used to teach prospective rhetors, these works have often been called *rhetorica docens*, the Latin term for a "teaching" rhetoric book. In addition, scholars over the centuries have studied what they regarded as excellent and effective texts—often speeches—produced by renowned rhetors, trying to infer principles that other rhetors could follow. Collectively, the exemplary texts have been called *rhetorica utens*, Latin for *rhetoric in use*. The traditional body of concepts that we know as rhetorical theory is derived from both the works of *rhetorica docens* and *rhetorica utens*.

The major elements of rhetorical theory are the rhetorical situation, the audience, the *pisteis* or "proofs" (and their subdivisions), and the five canons of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.

Although the concept of the rhetorical situation is inherent in the history of rhetoric from antiquity to the present, it is most clearly explicated in an essay written in 1968 by Lloyd Bitzer titled "The Rhetorical Situation" (reprinted in Part III). According to Bitzer, a situation is rhetorical when three elements are present: an exigence, an audience, and rhetorical constraints. An exigence is a need, a gap, something wanting, that can be met, filled in, or supplied *only* by a

spoken or written text. We can say that the exigence of a situation calls forth a text. Thus, exigence is related to *kairos* as a kind of "generative timeliness": The death of a famous person creates an exigence that calls forth a eulogy. Receiving lousy service from a public utility company creates an exigence that calls forth a letter of complaint. The discovery of a new concept by researchers—for example, the discovery of the double-helix structure of DNA by James Watson and Francis Crick—creates an exigence that calls forth an article reporting the discovery and arguing for its importance.

The audience, according to Bitzer, is not simply the aggregation of people who listen to or read the text called forth by the exigence. More specifically, the audience comprises the people who have a reason to be concerned about the exigence and who are capable of acting on it or being acted upon by it. The audience for a eulogy is the people who were connected, however remotely, to the deceased person and who are in the position to have their feelings of grief assuaged by the text. The audience for the letter of complaint is the people connected with the utility company who are in some position to see that the lousy service improves in the future. The audience for the report of the new discovery is the people who are concerned about the state of knowledge in the field and who believe that future research projects should be built on the foundations of newly validated concepts, whether they actually conduct those research projects themselves or simply keep informed of others who do.

Rhetorical constraints, according to Bitzer, are the features of the audience's—and perhaps the speaker's or writer's—frames of mind, belief systems, and ways of life that lead the audience to accept the speaker's or writer's ideas and to act upon the exigence. Rhetorical constraints include the audience's presuppositions and beliefs about the subject of the text as well as the patterns of demonstration or proof that the audience will accept. In other words, the constraints are ideas and attitudes that exist between the rhetor—motivated to create discourse by the exigence—and the auditors, who ideally will act upon this exigence. Constraints upon a eulogy include the facts about the deceased person's life and works that the audience can be expected to know, as well as the audience's beliefs about the thoughts and sentiments that are comforting in a time of grief. Constraints upon the letter of complaint include the writer's conception of what would constitute good service, the facts of the situation that amount to lousy service, and the types of appeals the writer believes she can make—appeals to her status as a good customer who regularly pays her bill, say, or appeals to the company's image as a trustworthy provider of service—that will induce the company to improve. Constraints upon the research report include the beliefs, shared by the writers and the audience, about the nature of an experiment or research project in the field, presumptions about the "objective" roles of the researchers themselves, the facts of the experiment or project that the researchers are reporting, and the patterns of reasoning they use (and fully expect their audience to "buy") in order to argue for their discovery as something significant in the intellectual community.

Although Bitzer's article brought together concepts that had already been

developed in rhetorical theory, some scholars found his characterization of exigence, audience, and constraints a bit too passive. Thus, his work was very productively revised in an article written eight years later by Richard Vatz, titled "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation" (reprinted in Part IV). The problem with Bitzer's depiction of the rhetorical situation, Vatz maintains, lies in Bitzer's tacit suggestion that exigences, audiences, and constraints exist as *a priori* categories, before a rhetor chooses to produce a text. It's not that exigences, audiences, and constraints are simply there, Vatz argues, and a rhetor simply trips over them and uses them. On the contrary, says Vatz, exigences, audiences, and constraints are created by rhetors who choose to activate them by inscribing them into their texts. In other words, a situation becomes rhetorical only when a speaker or writer evokes an audience within a text, embodies an exigence within the text that the evoked audience is led to respond to, and handles the constraints in such a way that the audience is convinced that they are true or valid. Bitzer's and Vatz's articles represent two major contributions to an important debate within rhetorical theory about whether texts simply recognize and make use of certain conditions or whether texts actually create those conditions.

AUDIENCE

At first glance, the concept of audience in rhetorical theory seems simple to illustrate, but that simplicity is deceptive. The term *audience* embodies a metaphor from the theater, and indeed when a speech is given before an assembly, we can say that that collection of people is an audience for the speech. In other words, the term *audience* can refer exclusively to those who *hear* a speech or performance, as suggested by a strict translation of *audire*, to hear. But the definition of audience becomes considerably tangled when we consider three complications: First, spoken texts are often recorded for later listening or transmitted electronically beyond the setting where they are performed. Second, spoken texts are often performed versions of previously written texts or are transcribed into written form after they are spoken, and are thus available for audiences completely removed in both time and space from the person who delivered the speech. Third, most of the texts we encounter are never spoken or intended to be spoken, but instead are written and, like transcribed spoken texts, may be read by anyone who happens to pick them up.

Scholars have tried to accommodate these complications by reconsidering the definition of audience. They have, for instance, distinguished the *primary* audience for a text from various *subsidiary* audiences; this distinction has also been drawn using the terms *immediate audience* and *mediated audiences*. Consider an example: The governing council of an economically developing city commissions an ecologist to write a report on the environmental implications of opening up a certain region of the city for commercial real estate development. The

primary, immediate audience for the ecologist's report would be the city council members. The report, however, would probably have at least several subsidiary or mediated audiences: the aides to the council members, who read important documents for their bosses and help them digest the material; potential real estate developers, who want to see whether their entrepreneurial plans are favored or foiled by the document; writers for the local media, who are responsible for reporting such issues in newspapers, magazines, radio, and television; and members of environmental protection groups, who want to maintain the ecological viability of the region in the face of what they consider threats posed by commercial development plans. The ecologist's text, to be most effective, would have to address the concerns of all these audiences in some way.

Drawing on canonical works from antiquity through the eighteenth century, traditional rhetorical theory has conceived a text's audience as some individual or collective "other" whom the rhetor must identify, analyze in psychological and emotional terms, and then, by means of the text, "change" in some way so that they will adhere to the rhetor's central idea or thesis. This traditional view has three drawbacks. First, it largely limits attention to the primary, immediate auditors in a rhetorical situation, and generally ignores any subsidiary, mediated audiences. Second, the traditional view tends to assume an antagonistic relation between the rhetor and the audience; it tacitly posits that there is some ideological, emotional, or psychological condition that must be changed within the auditors before they can accept the rhetor's ideas. Third, the traditional view ignores the shared, dialectical nature of communication by characterizing the rhetorical interaction as moving in one direction, from the rhetor to the auditor: The rhetor is the sender and the auditor is the receiver.

Clearly, real communication does not operate on such an immediate, one-way, agonistic street. Some theorists have conflated the concept of audience, as traditionally treated in rhetorical theory, with the concept of *speech community*, as developed in sociolinguistics. The result has been the forging of a new concept, *discourse community*, an entity defined by Martin Nystrand in 1982. A *discourse community*, according to Nystrand, comprises people who "may very well never speak or write to each other," but who "could effectively so interact if required since they know the ways-of-speaking of the group" (15; emphasis in original). In a 1991 work, John Swales provides a more comprehensive definition of discourse community: It comprises people who strive to achieve a "broadly agreed set" of epistemological or social goals by means of their spoken or written texts, who employ "mechanisms of intercommunication among members," who use "participatory mechanisms" to provide information and feedback concerning one another's texts, who use one or more genres "in the communicative furtherance of [the common] aims," and who conventionally use "some specific lexis" (24–27). Consider, for example, the kind of discourse community that has developed in many contemporary industrial settings as quality control operations have been shifted from a single department to the production workforce as a whole. Instead of having a company inspector examining the products as they

are being made, the workers themselves assess the products and they document, in writing, what is working well, what is not working, and what needs to be done differently in future shifts. They meet regularly, usually in "quality control teams," to go over the quality control documents they are writing and to plan modifications to both production and the documentation system; they produce a common genre, the "quality management report," which embodies their common knowledge of appropriate content, diction, and format. These workers form a discourse community.

The concept of a discourse community allows rhetorical theorists to analyze interactions among rhetors and both primary and subsidiary audiences, and to illustrate how audiences and speakers and writers influence each other's texts. A clear example of such an analysis is provided by the work of Greg Myers, a linguist at Lancaster University in Great Britain. In the early 1980s, Myers studied how two academic biologists—one a well-known researcher in his field and the other attempting to publish his first article in what for him was a new area—shaped their personae as they wrote grant proposals and articles for professional journals. Myers was able to analyze how the two biologists reacted differently to the responses by the grant proposal reviewers, as well as how the biologists tried to shape their articles to accommodate the range of auditors in their discourse community, which included the reviewers, the journal editors, and the readership of the journal.

The concept of audience is further complicated by the question whether the audience in mind is "addressed" or "evoked." As noted previously, rhetorical theory has traditionally conceived the audience as an isolated, usually antagonistic other whom rhetors have to "address" and "accommodate" in their texts. Clearly, there are some rhetorical situations in which the transaction between the rhetor and the auditors happens in exactly that way. But as early as 1975, with the publication of Walter Ong's essay, "The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction," rhetorical theorists began to characterize the writer-reader interaction in some texts as constructive rather than adaptive. In other words, in some rhetorical situations, writers cannot know with any certainty who their readers are; accordingly, writers work to *construct* an audience, playing on the assumptions and operating within the rhetorical constraints to which they presume the constructed audience would adhere. For example, when writing a letter to a friend or colleague, discussing common ideas or experiences, a writer addresses an auditor personally and immediately as a known entity. On the other hand, when writing an article for mass publication, a writer must *inscribe* or *invoke* the interests, knowledge, and needs of a presumed audience. In either case, the rhetor determines the *role* of the audience as part of the process of composing. A full explanation of this conception of audience is offered by Lisa Ede's and Andrea Lunsford's 1984 article, "Audience Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role of Audience in Composition Theory and Pedagogy."

MEANS OF PERSUASION

An ancient term for the kinds of appeals that may affect an audience is *pisteis*. The concept of the *pisteis* is Aristotelian, and the singular term *pistis*, usually understood as "proof," "appeal," or "means of persuasion," is one of those classical Greek terms for which we have no precise English equivalent. In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle discusses three sorts of textual appeals: to the authority of the rhetor (*ethos*), to the emotions or "stages of life" of the audience (*pathos*), and to systems of reasoning (*logos*) that the rhetor and the audience share. Although Aristotle categorizes the appeals separately, examining their operation clearly shows that they intersect and interact.

Ethos is generally defined as the good character and the consequent credibility of the rhetor. Theorists in ancient Greece and Rome did not agree among themselves whether *ethos* exists solely in the text a rhetor creates, or whether the rhetor must evince *ethos* in his or her life as well as in his or her texts. Aristotle maintained the former position: He taught that a text must demonstrate that the rhetor is a person of good sense (*phronesis*), virtue (*arete*), and good will (*eunoia*). A rhetor could not depend, according to Aristotle, on the audience's knowing more about the rhetor's *ethos* than the text itself established. The text must do the job. The theorists who translated and adapted Greek rhetoric for Roman life, notably Cicero and later Quintilian, tended to take the externalist position. Quintilian, who referred to *ethos* with the Latin term *auctoritas*, maintained that the character of a speaker or writer was as vital as the representations of it within a text. Thus, Quintilian taught that the expert at rhetoric was the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*: the good man [sic] skilled at speaking.

Although there are clearly instances where the *ethos* of a rhetor is demonstrated by actions and examples in life, because texts are today so frequently disseminated and consumed at a remove from the author, it is sensible to examine the ways the texts themselves inscribe a rhetor's *ethos*. Consider, for example, the convention in published academic papers of using footnotes and bibliographies to cite previously published studies. Why does a writer do this? Surely, some readers could use these citations to check the accuracy and validity of the writer's intellectual antecedents, and some readers might use them to guide their own reading or research on the same subject. Actually, however, such citations operate to invest the writer—and thus the text—with *phronesis*: good sense or "practical" wisdom. The writer becomes more credible because she has done the required homework in the field and shown it through the citations. Consider, to continue using the published academic paper as an example, the tradition of listing the author's academic affiliation in a byline, an address line, or a biographical paragraph; here is an example recently published to accompany an article by William Covino:

William A. Covino is professor of English at the University of Illinois, Chicago, where he teaches in the graduate program in language, literacy, and rhetoric. His articles on rhetorical theory and history have appeared in several journals, and his books include *The Art of Wondering: A Revisionist Return to the History of Rhetoric*, *Forms of Wondering: A Dialogue on Writing for Writers*, and *Magic, Rhetoric, and Literacy: An Eccentric History of the Composing Imagination*.

Although certainly some readers might want to correspond with the author or read something else he has written, for most such a listing amounts to a display of *arete*, a demonstration of affiliations and activities that amount to “virtue” in an academic context. Consider, to take a final example from this genre, the degree of deference an author shows to previous studies, even if his or her work will diverge radically from them, and the amount of polite hedging the author of an academic paper demonstrates when setting out the significance of his or her own thesis.

The pioneering histories of rhetoric produced early in the current revival (Kennedy, Corbett, and Kinneavy) have served virtually to bring into existence for a twentieth-century audience authors and texts ignored under the philosophic tradition. The task at hand now is to examine more closely the method of reading we bring to those texts and, more broadly, to the whole discursive field within which they take their places. The result will be different readings of canonical texts, as well as the identification of new significant sites of “rhetoric” in its more comprehensive sophistic definition. (Susan Jarratt, *Rereading the Sophists*, xix).

Jarratt might conceivably have been more dismissive of previous scholarship and more brash in asserting the importance of her own. Maintaining *eunoia*—good will toward the discourse community she hopes to engage with her work—requires the more respectful tone struck here, a tone we recognize as a strategic appeal at the same time that we presume it to be sincere.

We have already alluded to the second traditional *pistis* in our discussion of audience. This is the appeal to *pathos*, sometimes called the *pathetic* or the *emotional appeal*. The central idea underlying *pathos* is that an effective text will somehow activate or draw upon the sympathies and emotions of the auditors, causing them to attend to and accept its ideas, propositions, or calls for action. As with *ethos*, the source of most later rhetorical theory concerning *pathos* is Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. In Book I, Aristotle describes in detail the emotions he believes a text, depending on the rhetorical situation, could activate in order to persuade one’s audience: anger, calmness, friendship, enmity, fear, confidence, shame, shamelessness, kindness, unkindness, pity, indignation, envy, and emulation. In addition, he categorizes potential audiences into social groupings according to character types—the young, the elderly, people in their prime, aristocrats, the wealthy, and the powerful—and analyzes the dominant emotions inherent in each of these character types that a text might try to animate.

Two points about Aristotle’s view of *pathos* are noteworthy for understanding

the role of this appeal in rhetorical theory. First, his catalog of emotions and characters is thoroughly ethnocentric, tied to his purpose of providing instruction in rhetoric to young men who strove to gain political influence in fourth-century BCE Athens. There is little to suggest that rhetors in all, or even most, current rhetorical situations would find it wise to appeal to the emotions as Aristotle defines them. Nor would it probably be wise for rhetors to stereotype their auditors into Aristotle’s categories. Nonetheless, the basic move that Aristotle’s treatment illustrates—fitting one’s text to the character types and states of mind that make up one’s audience—remains legitimate in current rhetorical activity. Second, Aristotle assumes a neutral stance toward ethical issues related to pathetic appeals. Certainly current rhetorical theorists, as well as rhetors, need to distinguish between texts that indiscriminately titillate and pander to an audience’s emotions and texts in which *pathos* is tied to a virtuous *ethos*, in which a rhetor of goodwill seeks to evoke the same in the audience.

The third *pistis* is *logos*, the appeal to patterns, conventions, and modes of reasoning that the audience finds convincing and persuasive. Although it is common to translate *logos* into its cognate, the “logical” appeal, such a translation is imprecise and potentially misleading. *Logos* in ancient Greek means more than simply logic or reasoning; it means something like “thought plus action.” Thus, just as *ethos* moves an audience by activating their faith in the credibility of the rhetor and *pathos* stimulates their feelings and seeks a change in their attitudes and actions, so *logos*, accompanied by the other two appeals, mobilizes the powers of reasoning. (A)

Although *logos* has been explained using different terminology by rhetorical theorists over the centuries, the “logical” transaction they describe can always be characterized in the same general way. A rhetor enters a rhetorical situation either knowing, or prepared to discover, what she and her audience hold as common assumptions about the subject that she will discuss. Knowing that she will have to invoke these common assumptions either implicitly or explicitly in her text, she proceeds to offer a premise or observation about the situation at hand, about the subject of the text. With the common assumptions invoked and the premise or observation put into play, the speaker can then posit a conclusion that follows from the assumption and the premise; this conclusion is, in general terms, the central idea or thesis that the speaker or writer hopes the audience will believe or act upon. The key feature of this basic “logical” transaction of rhetoric is that none of its constituent elements is always, or even frequently, certain and beyond argument. That is, the speaker or writer might find herself in a wrangle with the audience about (1) what they do believe, think, or feel in common; (2) whether the premise or observation is just and appropriate; or (3) whether the conclusion—the central idea or thesis—actually does follow from the assumptions and premise, and even if it does, whether there are other circumstances that would prevent the audience from accepting the conclusion. Conversely, the speaker or writer might find the audience in perfect agreement with some or all of the constituents, in which case the “logical” rhetorical transaction succeeds grandly.

Three cases might provide instances of this basic logical transaction at work.

Case A is a simplified version of a rhetorical situation in the social sciences: A graduate student in psychology wants to investigate whether high school seniors learn more effectively if they listen to classical music while they study. Thus, the researcher identifies two groups of high school students, equal in number and gender, who on a pretest showed similar levels of ability and knowledge with respect to a particular subject. One group is the control group and the other the experimental group. The control group studies new material on the pretested subject under naturalistic conditions in a library; the experimental group studies the same material in the same location, but with classical music playing. The researcher finds that 95 percent of the students in the experimental group score higher on a post test than their counterparts in the control group. In the report of this experiment, the researcher attributes the success of the experimental group to the presence of classical music in the students' study environment.

Case B comes from American history: The second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence reads, in part, as follows:

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

The Declaration then proceeds to list and elaborate the "long train of abuses and usurpations" of these "inalienable rights," 19 such violations in all, perpetrated by George III, king of England. Thus, the representatives to the General Congress assembled in 1776 could "solemnly publish and declare, that these united colonies are, and of right ought to be free and independent states; that they are absolved from allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be totally dissolved."

Case C is another hypothetical case, this time from literary criticism: A student in an American literature class is reading William Faulkner's novel *As I Lay Dying* and encounters the character Dewey Dell. The name sounds vaguely familiar to the student, and he seems to remember a phrase in Percy Bysshe Shelley's poem, "To a Skylark," where some action takes place "in a dell of dew." The student eventually reads further into Faulkner's work, finds many echoes of phrases from English romantic poetry, and writes a term paper detailing the influences of the romantics on the American novelist.

How does *logos*, the invocation of and appeal to a potential reader's system of reasoning, operate in each case? Only in rare instances does a discourse function "logically" by announcing incontrovertible premises as assumptions, by positing

empirically verifiable and irrefutable observations about the subject matter at hand, and by offering a claim that is based on a "logical" chain of reasoning from assumptions through observation to a conclusion. In other words, *logos* generally does not function logically; it functions rhetorically, and each element of the appeal—the assumptions, the observation, and the claim—may be debatable and admit of more than one possibility.

Case A represents a classic, if oversimplified, version of what social scientists would call a causal-comparative study. The researcher is working from three of the ruling assumptions of the experimental research community: first, that we live in an essentially behaviorist world where people's actions come in response to various stimuli that affect them; second, that it is possible to establish a research setting in which all the conditions under which the research subjects are operating are controlled and in which a single, isolatable variable can be manipulated; and, third, that when conditions have been controlled, any differences in behavior between two groups of research subjects can be attributed to the causal influence of the single, manipulated variable. Although none of these assumptions is indisputable, the researcher does not explicitly argue for their validity. Such assumptions are, he presumes, part of the conventional *logos* already operating in his scholarly field, and they effectively constitute some of the premises for his conclusion, that 95 percent of the students who listened to classical music while they studied scored higher on a post test than their non-music-listening counterparts. Because the researcher has established a conventional and controlled investigative structure, this observation itself is largely indisputable. Some readers might question the *validity* of the post test, asking whether it really measures anything significant about the students' performance, but no one can question the *reliability* of the assessment. Armed with these data, the researcher is prepared to make his claim, to argue that the higher scores of the music listeners were caused by their more relaxed states or their more intense concentration, both attributable, in the researcher's argument, to the presence of the classical music.

The operation of *logos* in Case B involves one of the most famous examples of explicitly stated assumptions in history. The authors of the Declaration of Independence boldly state the credo, the "self-evident truths" upon which their argument is built: All people are created equal and are entitled to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness; when any government impedes this pursuit, the people may abolish it and institute a new government. As with the experimentalist/behaviorist assumptions in Case A, the question of whether these assumptions are universally "true" or "valid" is a moot point. They are certainly "true" and "valid" within the theology and cosmology of the authors of the Declaration, who see them as "self-evident"; similarly, the authors assume, anyone reading or hearing their text will agree.

Coming in the wake of the power and euphony of the "self-evident" assumptions, the actual observation that the authors make about the situation seems rather prosaic: In 19 ways, the king of England has violated the colonists' rights

to the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness. Unlike the “hard-data” observations in Case A, the assertions in Case B cannot be so easily verified empirically. The assertions themselves—for example, that George III has kept a standing army in the colonies—are contentious and open to dispute. But notice that the authors of the Declaration do not invite the audience to dispute the truth of these assertions. They simply lay each assertion out, offer a bit of evidence to illustrate it, and then move to the claim: The colonies are independent of Great Britain. If you buy into the “self-evident” assumptions and you agree that the actions of George III cited in the document represent breaches of these “truths,” then you must concur that the colonists have a right to declare their independence and that this document makes it so.

Case C builds its claim on a common assumption in the rhetoric of Western literary criticism, namely that authors are influenced by the work of their predecessors, particularly those revered as “great authors” in the canon of British and American literature. Although this assumption has been freighted with psychological implications by Harold Bloom and other scholars, traditionally literary critics have not seen it as troubling in the *logos* of a critical argument. Thousands of critical theses in articles, papers, monographs, and books have been put forward based on the assumption that the influence of a previous “great author” on a latter one is discernible, perhaps conscious on the part of the latter, and generally a good thing for literary criticism to make note of. Again, this assumption is not provable; it is simply a notion that students of literature tacitly adhere to. The student in Case C discovers a “manifest intertextuality,” a patch of language in Faulkner that so closely resembles a passage in Shelley that the critic must assume that the similarity is intentional; indeed, other passages in Faulkner show distinct Shelleyesque echoes as well. Accepting the assumption about influence and citing the intertextual passages, the student in American literature can argue, probably convincingly, that Faulkner was influenced by the literature of British romanticism.

This basic transaction of *logos*—assumptions, assertion or observation, and claim—is called an *enthymeme*. According to Aristotle, speakers or writers arguing a case either construct enthymemes or cite examples; those are the only two persuasive devices available. Unfortunately, Aristotle’s own definition of the enthymeme is quite sketchy. He explains that the enthymeme is to rhetoric what the syllogism is to logic. A syllogism offers an incontrovertible proposition as its major premise, an empirically verifiable observation as its minor premise, and a necessary, logical conclusion; an enthymeme, however, might be contentious at all three points. It is a “rhetorical syllogism” that depends for acceptance upon the context in which it occurs. In the centuries since Aristotle, rhetorical theorists have tried to flesh out his suggestive definition. Some have seen the enthymeme as a materially deficient syllogism because neither its premises or conclusions are provable; some have seen it as formally deficient because the major premise—what the rhetor believes that the audience presumes to be true—often goes unstated, and the minor premise—the assertion or observation—is occasionally implicit as well. Contemporary rhetoricians have largely stopped trying to distinguish the

enthymeme from the syllogism, simply accepting that the two logical devices have some formal and material similarities but are essentially different.

The other logical device Aristotle describes, the example, might initially seem the converse of the enthymeme, but actually the two devices are related. Anyone who has ever argued a case knows the value of citing a precedent. If you are campaigning for a Republican presidential candidate and arguing that he or she will act decisively to protect American economic interests in the oil-rich Middle East, you might cite the precedent of George Bush’s actions in the Gulf War and claim that your candidate will be equally decisive. To Aristotle, however, an example is more than a single instance that acts as a precedent. The Greek word Aristotle uses for example is *paradeigma*, from which English draws the cognate *paradigm*. To be rhetorically effective, an example must offer a repeated pattern of precedents. For example, if a rhetor is arguing that, despite its advocates’ claims to the contrary, the “Star Wars” defense system will probably be used aggressively and offensively, she might cite the example of previous weapons systems: “They said the incendiary bomb would be used only for defense and it was used offensively; they said the hydrogen bomb would be used only for defense and it was used offensively; they said the atomic bomb would be used only for defense and it was used offensively. Shouldn’t we expect, then, that the ‘Star Wars’ system will be used offensively?”

Although the enthymeme looks like what a logician would call a deduction and the example looks logically like an induction, they are similar in their effect rhetorically. As James Raymond has perceptively noted, the example is itself a kind of enthymeme. Its major premise, the unstated assumption, is that history tends to repeat itself. Its observation, its assertion about the situation at hand, consists of the pattern of precedent-setting instances. Its claim is the conjecture about the future that follows from this premise and the cited instances.

Although the enthymeme and example are usually discussed in rhetorical theory under the rubric of *logos*, these two tools of argument are not devoted exclusively to appealing to the logic and reasoning of the audience. Indeed, in order to move an audience to believe what the rhetor holds as a communal assumption, to accept her observation about the subject at hand as valid and legitimate, and to adhere to the conclusion that she claims follows from the assumption and the observation, she may need to deploy *pathos* and *ethos* as well. That is, arguing enthymematically may require her to appeal to the audience’s reasoning, emotions, interests, and to her own credibility and character.

THE CANONS OF RHETORIC

In addition, although the enthymeme and example are often discussed in rhetorical theory as elements of *logos*, they are also central elements in the first of what the Roman rhetoricians proposed as the five canons of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Each of these canons is considered sep-

arately later in Part II, but conceptual definitions of each at this point will suggest how they have been developed as general features within rhetorical theory.

Invention is the art of generating effective material for a particular rhetorical situation. Some rhetorical theorists have argued that *invention* is not a completely appropriate term for this canon because the rhetor often does not generate *new* material, but simply calls it forth from memory. Invention requires the rhetor to assess the audience in order to determine what they feel, think, and know about the subject he intends to speak or write about; to determine, at least provisionally, what purpose he hopes his text will accomplish; and thus to decide what kinds of material—facts, propositions, ideas, and so on—he will inscribe in the text. For many rhetors, these determinations are made subconsciously, simultaneously, and perhaps even randomly. Nonetheless, such decisions allow the rhetor to probe his thoughts, knowledge base, and experiences and the data in the world around him, and to generate material he believes will be effective for the particular audience and purposes he will invoke. Some rhetors effect this search for material using techniques specific to their particular discipline. For example, a writer constructing an argument in literary criticism may search a novel, poem, or play for some apparently anomalous or distinct feature of plot, character, theme, or diction, with a view to explicating it. Some rhetors, on the other hand, invent material by using some form of structured heuristic (derived from the Greek for *finding*) technique, such as an abbreviated form of Aristotle's *topoi*, Kenneth Burke's dramatic pentad (which investigates human action as the interaction of Act, Agent, Scene, Agency, and Purpose), the common "journalist's questions," or the tagmemic matrix (which adapts terms from physics—particle, wave, field—as categories for understanding the nature of a unit of information). Finally, some rhetors may generate material using a relatively unstructured, even intuitive, heuristic such as freewriting, brainstorming, and drawing tree diagrams.

Arrangement, sometimes called "disposition," is the art of ordering the material in a text so that it is most appropriate for the needs of the audience and the purpose the text is designed to accomplish. Every effective rhetor understands, at least intuitively, that in most conventional situations a text must have a beginning, a middle, and an end, but methods of producing this order differ widely. Some speakers and writers considering arrangement may use principles drawn from ancient rhetoric; in general terms, these principles suggest that an effective argument is specifically ordered first to capture the audience's attention, second to provide necessary background information, third to state and prove the text's thesis or central idea, fourth to anticipate and address possible countertheses, and finally to conclude by appealing to the audience's emotions. Rather than relying on any general laws, however, most rhetors derive principles of arrangement from the genres their discourse community values and expects from speakers and writers within it. For example, a writer of scientific research reports knows that for her text to command the attention of people in the discipline, she must write an introduction that frames a research question, a section outlining the methods and materials involved in her research, a section detailing the

results of the specific project, and a section arguing that these results actually mean something significant.

Some rhetorical theorists have included under the rubric of arrangement not only principles for ordering entire texts, but also guidelines for arranging information within smaller units, such as paragraphs. The work of the Scottish rhetorician Alexander Bain, for example, led many scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to describe the arrangement of material in both whole texts and paragraphs according to the *mode of discourse* they were supposed to display: narration, description, exposition (often subdivided into such "methods of exposition" as cause-and-effect, definition, comparison-contrast, and so on), and argumentation. Finally, some rhetorical theorists have treated issues of the relative importance of information under arrangement. One mode of arrangement-by-importance is Nestorian order, named after the clear-voiced orator of the Greeks in the Trojan War. Nestor, according to legend, would begin a speech with the next-to-most important information, then provide the least important, and close with the most important.

The canon of arrangement has been called into question with the advent of postmodernism, in particular through the insistence that no text ever really "begins" or "ends"; rather, as Burke's "conversation in the parlor" above suggests, all texts enter into a larger text. The artificiality of beginnings and endings has been explored by postmodern writers such as Roland Barthes, as the excerpt above from *S/Z* indicates. For an audience of postmodern literary theorists, then, the rhetor might deliberately create a discourse that violates the conventions of arrangement, one that accepts and welcomes the disorderliness of open intellectual play.

Style, sometimes called elocution, is the art of producing sentences and words that will make an appropriately favorable impression on readers or listeners. Traditionally, the canon of style has included discussions of levels of language—the grand, the middle, and the low, for example—as well as explanations of *tropes*, or figures of thought, and *schemes*, or figures of actual expression. To cite just three examples: Under the rubric of tropes, rhetorical theorists have explained the nature and uses of metaphor (implied comparison), personification (the attribution of human qualities to nonhuman entities), and synecdoche (the substitution of the part for the whole). Under schemes, rhetorical theorists have catalogued such devices as parallelism (creating a similarity of structure in a set of related words, phrases, or clauses), ellipsis (a deliberate omission of words that are readily supplied by the context), and anaphora (the repetition of the same words at the beginning of successive phrases or clauses). A great debate in the history of rhetoric has surrounded the question of whether style is simply an ornamentation of thought and speech, or whether style is "organic" to the specific text and represents, as Thomas De Quincey proposed, the "incarnation of thought."

Most modern rhetorical theorists have adopted some version of the latter position and see style as the process of "giving presence" to ideas that rhetors

want their audiences to attend to. Chaim Perelman, among others, has discussed presence in terms of the emphasis that the rhetor gives to "events which, without his intervention, would be neglected but now occupy our attention." The rhetor can do this by presenting images that will affect an audience—"Caesar's bloody tunic as brandished by Antony, the children of the victim of the accused"—or by applying techniques of *amplification* (e.g., "repetition, accumulation, accentuation of particular passages") that highlight the "reality" that the rhetor would like to present (Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, 35–37).

Memory, the fourth traditional canon of rhetoric, seems to bear the most residue of the oral culture in which rhetorical theory has its ancient roots; however, memory is undergoing something of a revival in contemporary theory. In classical periods, rhetors were expected to commit their speeches to memory. In later periods, the art of memory was taught to young rhetors as a means of mental discipline, even though they most often read texts that had been written out. The most commonly taught mnemonic method was for rhetors to associate the parts of the speech with visual images in some specific physical setting. For example, a rhetor could mentally connect the introduction of his speech to the porch of a house, the background narration to the foyer, the thesis and proof to the arch and the grand ballroom, and the conclusion to the antechamber. As rhetoric over the centuries became more and more an art of crafting and delivering written texts, the canon of memory diminished in importance. In current rhetorical theory, however, computers are being used to store monumental databases and rhetors are devising increasingly inventive ways to manipulate these data, so memory is becoming a vital canon once again.

Delivery, the final traditional canon of rhetorical theory, once constituted the art of using one's voice and body effectively when speaking. Elaborate theory and pedagogy, in both classical periods and later in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was developed to teach rhetors how to pronounce words, project their voices, and move their faces, arms, hands, and even legs and feet. In departments offering courses in public speaking today, contemporary principles of delivery are still being developed; where rhetorical theory and pedagogy are more concerned with written texts, the canon of delivery has come to embrace the study of *graphemics*, the display of material on the printed page or screen.

When one teaches rhetoric, either its theory or its effective practice, one can teach principles of invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery as general tenets, applicable in varying degrees to discourse in all fields. However, as suggested earlier, rhetoric has developed during the second half of this century as the study and practice of the featuring of specific content that is vital to the epistemological and social functions of special-interest groups. The title of a 1983 book by Christopher Norris, *The Deconstructive Turn: Essays in the Rhetoric of Philosophy*, suggests what might have been regarded as a heretical idea in centuries past—that philosophy is rhetorical. The "rhetorizing" of academic subjects that were once regarded as objective, and whose scholars regarded themselves as disinterested, comes along with the postmodern recognition that all

discourse serves to advance certain interests, certain versions of truth and facts that serve individual and institutional biases and motives. One of the projects of rhetoric has become the investigation of how such biases and motives are inscribed into academic and scholarly discourses, and so we see increasing attention by humanists, scientists, and social scientists to the *pisteis* of the writing that defines their fields. The presence of rhetoric in other fields is addressed extensively in Part IV of this book in order to suggest what a global art rhetoric has become in our time.

WORKS CITED

- Aristotle. *Rhetoric*. Trans. George Kennedy. New York: Oxford UP, 1991.
- . *Poetics*. Trans. W. Hamilton Fyfe. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1932.
- Barthes, Roland. *S/Z*. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974.
- Berthoff, Ann E. *The Making of Meaning: Metaphors, Models, and Maxims for Writing Teachers*. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook, 1981.
- Bitzer, Lloyd. "The Rhetorical Situation." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1.1 (1968): 1–14.
- Brooks, Cleanth. *The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry*. New York: Harcourt, 1947.
- Burke, Kenneth. *Permanence and Change*. 3rd ed. 1935. Berkeley: U of California P, 1984.
- . *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. 3rd ed. Berkeley: U of California P, 1973.
- . "Rhetoric—Old and New." *New Rhetorics*. 1950. Ed. Martin Steinmann. New York: Scribner's, 1967.
- Cicero, *On Oratory and Orators (De Oratore)*. Trans. J. S. Watson. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1970.
- Cixous, Helene. "The Laugh of the Medusa." *Critical Theory Since 1965*. Ed. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle. Tallahassee: Florida State UP, 1986. 309–320.
- Ede, Lisa, and Andrea Lunsford. "Audience Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role of Audience in Composition Theory and Pedagogy." *College Composition and Communication* 35 (1984): 155–71.
- De Quincey, Thomas. "Rhetoric." *Selected Essays on Rhetoric*. Ed. Frederick Burwick. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1967. 81–133.
- Eagleton, Terry. *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983.
- Jarratt, Susan. *Rereading the Sophists*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1991.
- Kennedy, George. "A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 25.1 (1992): 1–21.
- Myers, Greg. "The Social Construction of Two Biologists' Proposals." *Written Communication* 2 (1985): 219–45.
- Norris, Christopher. *The Deconstructive Turn: Essays in the Rhetoric of Philosophy*. London: Methuen, 1983.
- Nystrand, Martin. "Rhetoric's 'Audience' and Linguistics' 'Speech Community': Implications For Understanding Writing, Reading, and Text." *What Writers Know: The Language, Process, and Structure of Written Discourse*. Ed. Martin Nystrand. New York: Academic, 1982. 1–30.
- Ong, Walter. "The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction." *PMLA* 90 (1975): 9–21.

Forms of persuasion

- Perelman, Chaim. *The Realm of Rhetoric*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1982.
- Plato. *Phaedrus*. Trans. Harold North Fowler. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1914.
- Quintilian. *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian*. Trans. H. E. Butler. 4 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1921.
- Raymond, James. "Enthymemes, Examples, and Rhetorical Method." *Essays in Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse*. Eds. Robert J. Connors, Lisa Ede, and Andrea Lunsford. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1984. 140-51.
- Swales, John. *Genre Analysis: English in Academic and Research Settings*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.
- Valesio, Paolo. *Novantiqua*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1980.
- Vatz, Richard. "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 6 (1972): 154-61.